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Abstract
Recent works have demonstrated that machine learning
models are vulnerable to model inversion attacks, which
lead to the exposure of sensitive information contained
in their training dataset. While some model inversion
attacks have been developed in the past in the black-box
attack setting, in which the adversary does not have di-
rect access to the structure of the model, few of these
have been conducted so far against complex models such
as deep neural networks. In this paper, we introduce
GAMIN (for Generative Adversarial Model INversion), a
new black-box model inversion attack framework achiev-
ing significant results even against deep models such as
convolutional neural networks at a reasonable comput-
ing cost. GAMIN is based on the continuous training of
a surrogate model for the target model under attack and
a generator whose objective is to generate inputs resem-
bling those used to train the target model. The attack
was validated against various neural networks used as
image classifiers. In particular, when attacking models
trained on the MNIST dataset, GAMIN is able to ex-
tract recognizable digits for up to 60% of labels produced
by the target. Attacks against skin classification mod-
els trained on the pilot parliament dataset also demon-
strated the capacity to extract recognizable features from
the targets.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the combination of increasing computing
power, significant improvement in machine learning algo-
rithms, as well as the augmentation of storage capacity
have led to the development of prediction services. Those
services rely on exploiting a wide variety of data, the
collection of which has become an integral part of most
digital and real-life markets. This push for personalized
services has driven forward the use of sensitive data even
in public-oriented applications such as evaluating the risk
of recidivism of convicted inmates [1]. In addition, the
gathered data has also become a vital asset for providers,
which often seek to ensure the exclusivity over it.
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Unfortunately, data-driven algorithms such as machine
learning models are not immune to information leak-
age [2, 3]. In particular, if those models have been
trained over personal information, then an attack exploit-
ing those leakages could result in a privacy breach (e.g.,
by inferring a sensitive feature for some of these individ-
uals) for the individuals contained in the dataset used to
train a learning algorithm. The potency of such an at-
tack was first demonstrated in 2015 by Fredrikson, Jha
and Ristenpart [6], extending as far as retrieving recog-
nizable facial features or inferring with great accuracy
a single sensitive feature. In subsequent works, efforts
have been made to quantify the vulnerability of machine
learning models against inference attacks related to pri-
vacy. For instance, new attacks, such as membership
inference attack [5], as well as new metrics such as differ-
ential training privacy [4], have been developed.
Nonetheless some questions remain opened, especially
with respect to the exploration of the possible attacks
settings. Indeed, depending on the ability of the adver-
sary to access the target model and his auxiliary knowl-
edge of that model, the approach taken as well as the
resulting efficiency can change significantly. Considering
model inversion attacks, in which the attacker attempts
to generate inputs resembling the original ones, Fredrik-
son and co-authors have left the design of effective black-
box attacks as an open problem in their seminal paper
[6]. While a first significant step was proposed later [10],
which consists in performing a black-box model extrac-
tion attack followed by the same white-box equation-
solving attack used by Fredrikson and co-authors, this
does not preclude the possibility that other approaches
could be more efficient either in terms of the reconstruc-
tion accuracy or with respect to the knowledge required
on the model attacked. In particular, one of the lim-
its of the equation-solving attack is that it requires the
knowledge of the target’s architecture.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach that we
coined as GAMIN (for Generative Adversarial Model IN-
version) to specifically address the problem of black-box
model inversion. Our attack is agnostic in the sense
that we make no assumptions on the design of the target
model or the original data distribution, which could ar-
guably be the most difficult situation for the adversary
[8]. In a nutshell, our attack involves the simultaneous
training of a surrogate model approximating the decision
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boundaries of the target and a generator that aims at
producing the desired inputs, by mimicking the Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks (GANs) training process. To
evaluate its cost and performance and how those are im-
pacted by the target’s architecture, our approach was
tested against a collection of classifier models. To ensure
the genericity of this evaluation, we chose to consider tar-
gets of various complexity, the design of which has been
observed and tested in previous works in the literature.
In particular, we have been able to demonstrate the po-
tency of this attack against image classification models
for digit recognition or skin color identification.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First in Sec-
tion 2, we introduce the machine learning models nec-
essary to the understanding of our work and their vul-
nerabilities with respect to various privacy attacks. Af-
terwards in Section 3, we present the architecture of the
GAMIN before describing in details how this attack per-
forms against five models trained on the MNIST dataset
in Section 4. Finally, we briefly review the related work
in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6 by discussing
future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the relevant background on
machine learning as well as model inversion attacks.
2.1 Machine learning models
Supervised learning refers to the sub-domain of the ma-
chine learning field whose objective is to learn a function
F : X → Y given a training dataset of input-output pairs
(x, y) ∈ X × Y .
The learning task is said to be a classification problem
if y is a label or a regression problem if y is a continuous
vector. The function F is called a classifier when the
possible values of Y correspond to a finite number of
classes and a regressor if the value of Y is outputted from
a continuous domain. A well-trained function F should
not only display a low error on the training set but also
generalize to unknown x˜ ∈ X.
To provide a concrete example, neural networks have
been recently re-popularized as a flexible solution for
most supervised machine learning tasks. Neural networks
rely on the composition of parametric functions to map
an input x to an output y [7]. Those parametric func-
tions correspond to layers of neurons, which are com-
puting units parametrized by a weight vector θ and an
activation function. Each unit, or neuron, outputs the
result of its activation function to the weighted sum of
its inputs. The weights themselves are updated by op-
timizers such as stochastic gradient descent with respect
to a loss function.
Deep neural networks are an extension of neural net-
works to more complex architectures. Examples of such
models include recurrent neural networks that allow for
the treatment or production of sequences of inputs and
outputs or convolutional layers that take into account
the local context of each value in the vectors it processed
[9]. By accounting for context and evolution, deep neu-
ral networks can extract and interpret patterns, which
in turn allows for a substantial increase in performance
[12]. Such models are now widely used in fields such as
computer vision or natural language processing.
2.2 Generative adversarial networks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [11] refers to
a framework composed of two models competing against
each other, hence the term “adversarial”. In this setting,
one of the models has the role of the generator G while
the other takes the role of the discriminator D. Figure 1
depicts the associated learning process.
Noise z
Generator G
Generated sample G(z) Real sample x
Discriminator D
Discrimination: real or generated
Update
Figure 1: GAN architecture.
In a nutshell, D aims at distinguishing real data from
fake one while G tries to fools D into taking a fake data
it has generated for a real one. This process has been
formally defined [11] as a minimax game between G and
D:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼px(x)[log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z))],
in which px(x) is the real data distribution and pz(z) is
usually a simple distribution (e.g., N (0, 1)).
2.3 Adversarial setting
When attempting an attack on a machine learning model,
an adversary can have different access and knowledge of
the target model [13] that we briefly introduced hereafter.
White-box setting. In the white-box setting, the adver-
sary knows the architecture of the target model as well as
its parameters and internal states. Typically, this setting
occurs when a malicious client obtains a complete trained
model from a MLaaS (Machine Learning as a Service)
provider rather than a dataset and wishes to learn more
2
about the original proprietary data this model has been
trained on.
Black-box setting. When only given black-box access,
the adversary does not have a direct access to the model
and can only query it with an input of his choice to re-
ceive the corresponding output (usually through an on-
line API). For example, this scenario corresponds to the
situation in which a company providing MLaaS is at-
tacked by one of its users. However, in some cases the
adversary may have partial knowledge of the data used
to train the target model (e.g., the characteristics of the
distribution) or of the target model’s architecture.
Black-box agnostic setting. The arguably hardest set-
ting for the adversary is when it has absolutely no infor-
mation on the training data (including no prior knowl-
edge of the data distribution) as well as the model archi-
tecture or any of its parameters besides the dimensions
of inputs and outputs. Basically, in this setting, which
we refer to as the agnostic black-box setting, the adver-
sary can only query the target model to make inferences
about it.
2.4 Model inversion attacks against ma-
chine learning models
Model inversion attacks [45, 6] (also known as attribute
inference attacks [49, 48]) aim to infer hidden sensitive
attribute of instances that belong to a particular out-
put class of a target machine learning model. Pioneering
works in this field [45, 6] have proposed a generic frame-
work to conduct model inversion attacks that can be de-
scribed as follows. Given a target model T , an instance
x — whose non-sensitive attributes x1, x2, . . . xxd−1 and
attributes’ prior probabilities are known to the adver-
sary — and the prediction y = T (x) of the target
model T , the attack identifies the value of the sensi-
tive attribute xd maximizing the posterior probability
P (xd|x1, x2, . . . xxd−1, y).
Model inversion attacks have been successfully con-
ducted against a variety of models, including neural
networks in the white-box setting with equation-solving
methods [6], through the reconstruction of recognizable
portraits. The question of effective black-box attack with
respect to this method was left as an open question. One
of the proposed approach to realize this is to run a white-
box inversion attack after a successful black-box model
extraction attack [10], thus achieving similar results at
a fraction of the cost. However, none of these attacks
were performed against a convolutional neural network
or other types of deep neural networks. In addition,
equations-solving attacks require prior knowledge of the
target model’s architecture, which severely undermines
their feasibility in an agnostic black-box setting.
For image recognition tasks, the output of a model in-
version attack is usually not a member of the training
set, but rather an average of the features characterizing
the class. Depending on the diversity of inputs yielding
the targeted class, this average may lead to a more or less
severe privacy breach. For instance, if a class correspond
to a particular individual and the training instances cor-
responding to the latter have small variance (e.g., same
location for the face or same shooting angle) then the
result of the attack can help in re-identifying the individ-
ual. In contrast, if the output class characterizes highly
diverse instances (e.g., car of very different types), then
the output of the attack is more difficult to interpret.
In this case, the output of the attack is very similar to
that of a property inference attack [34] (see Section 5.2
for more details and examples about property inference
attacks).
3 Our approach: The GAMIN
In this section, we will first introduce the Generative Ad-
versarial Model INversion (GAMIN) framework before
detailing the attack process.
3.1 Overview
Let us consider a target model T and a label yt corre-
sponding to one of its labels. The objective of our attack
is to characterize the inputs xt such that T (xt) = yt.
At a high level, GAMIN is composed of two deep neural
networks, namely a generator G : Z → X that maps
noise z ∼ N (0, 1) to an input xG and a surrogate model
S : X → Y that outputs an estimation yˆ of the target
model’s output. GAMIN allows to simultaneous train the
surrogate model S and the generator G while performing
a model inversion attack over S. Thus, the generator
aims at learning the distribution of input xt associated
to the label yt.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the training sequence of
GAMIN. For each step of the algorithm, a batch ZG is
sampled from random noise N (0, 1). Then, the genera-
tor uses the latter to produce a batch XG. Afterwards,
the target model T is queried with (1) the output XG
of the generator and (2) a batch XS sampled from ran-
dom noise N (0, 1). Subsequently, the predictions of T
on both XG and XS are used to compute the surrogate
loss LS (see Section 3.2.1), which is then used to inform
the training of the surrogate S. Finally, the generator’s
parameters are updated through the training of the com-
bined model (see Section 3.2.2) S ◦G on a batch ZG sam-
pled from random noise N (0, 1). After convergence, the
surrogate learns the target model’s decision boundaries
and the generator learns to approximate xt.
Given the black-box agnostic setting of the adversary,
the architecture of GAMIN has to be as generic as possi-
ble. More precisely, the only constraint put on the archi-
tecture is that the dimensions and ranges of the outputs
of the generator match the inputs of the target model
T and GAMIN’s surrogate S. We demonstrate this by
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Algorithm 1 GAMIN training
Require: (G, θG) generator model, (S, θS) shadow
model, T target model, yt target label to invert, k0
initial boundary-equilibrium factor, λk, γk boundary-
equilibrium update parameters
k ← k0
for n epochs do
. Generate artificial inputs from noise
ZG ∼ N (0, 1)
XG ← G(ZG)
. Generate raw noise input
XS ∼ N (0, 1)
. Query from the target model
YG ← T (XG)
YS ← T (XS)
. Compute boundary-equilibrium loss and train
surrogate
LS ← LH(XS , YS)− k ∗ LH(XG, YG)
θS ← train(XS , YS , LS)
k ← k + λk(γkLH(XS , YS)− LH(XG, YG))
. Train generator
ZG ∼ N (0, 1)
θS◦G ← train(ZG, yt)
end for
using the same architecture — for both GAMIN’s surro-
gate and the generator — for all the attacks conducted
in this paper. In addition, we have deliberately chosen
for the surrogate model an architecture different from
that of the target models to emphasize the absence of
prior knowledge by the adversary. Technical details of
GAMIN’s surrogate and generator can be found respec-
tively in Appendix A.1.1 and A.2.1.
3.2 Loss, metrics and convergence
The adversarial nature of GAMIN requires the surrogate
and the generator to be trained alternatively, each with
its own losses and metrics. However, the training of one
component impact the performances of the other. To
overcome this challenge, we need to devise appropriate
loss functions and metrics to have better control of the
training process.
3.2.1 Boundary-equilibrium loss for surrogate
model
Initial experiments with this architecture proved its dif-
ficulty to assess convergence and to compare the perfor-
mance performances of both the surrogate and the gen-
erator. Since these issues are common in the GAN lit-
erature, we adapted the Boundary-Equilibrium Adaptive
loss from BEGAN [15] to GAMIN. The main idea is to
have the loss function updating itself to reflect the trade-
off between the surrogate loss on samples according to
their nature. More precisely, the distinction operated by
the surrogate will be between noise inputs and generated
samples. Further differences with the original BEGAN
include adapting the setting from an auto-encoder per-
spective to our GAMIN setting. The loss for the surro-
gate model LS is defined as:
LS = LH(XS , YS)− kt ∗ LH(XG, YG)
kt+1 = kt + λk(γkLH(XS , YS)− LH(XG, YG)),
in which LH is the cross-entropy loss function, XS (resp.
XG) are noise inputs for the surrogate S (resp. inputs
crafted by the generator G), YS (resp. YG) are predic-
tions of the target model T on XS (resp. XG), λk is a
“learning rate” for the parameter kt and γk is an equilib-
rium ratio objective.
By allowing to balance the training of the surrogate
and the generator, this loss helps in avoiding the issue
of the unforgiving teacher. This phenomenon is observed
when a GAN’s generator does not improve because its
outputs are so far from expectations that it receives uni-
formly negative output [16]. In addition, the adaptive
loss helps in determining and improving the component
that is limiting the overall performance. Finally, it re-
duces the occurrences of catastrophic forgetting, which
may plague GAN-based architectures, and occurs when
the learning of a new skill severely damages a previously
learned one [17].
3.2.2 Generator model training through com-
bined networks
The update of the generator is achieved by merging both
the generator and surrogate into a virtual “combined”
neural network S ◦G. Then, the parameters of the com-
bined network are updated through a standard training
procedure. During this training, all the parameters re-
lated to the surrogate are kept frozen. Recall that the
objective of the “combined” model is to map noise zG to
the estimation of the target outputs upon receiving the
generated inputs S(G(zG)), to achieve S(G(zG)) ≈ yt
through training. Thus, the “combined” model is trained
as performing a simple classification task with a cross-
entropy loss function. Cross-entropy loss is defined as
L(y, yˆ) = −∑i yilog(yˆi), with y being the distribution of
probabilities across labels and yˆ the estimation of these
probabilities.
3.2.3 Relevance metrics
In this section, we discuss the metrics used to monitor
and control the training and convergence of GAMIN.
Surrogate fidelity. One of the fundamental measure for
our approach is the surrogate fidelity, which reflects the
capacity of the surrogate to imitate the target model’s
behaviour. With the same input x for the target model
T and the surrogate S, let y = T (x) and yˆ = S(x) be the
outputs of these models. The fidelity FS of the surrogate
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can be expressed as 1− ||y−yˆ||||y|| . In practice, we compute
the mean of this fidelity, which is then 1−mae(y, yˆ), mae
being the mean average error, and we test the fidelity over
a batch of 64 samples of uniform random noise. Note that
fidelity differs from precision in that it needs not be eval-
uated over testing samples, which means that it can be
measured during a black-box attack with no knowledge
of the original data. A surrogate with high fidelity (up to
1) estimates with good precision the decision boundaries
of the target model.
Combined accuracy. The generator’s ability to craft
inputs that are classified in the desired way by the sur-
rogate is measured by the categorical accuracy AS◦G of
the “combined” model (see Section 3.2.2). When assessed
in a batch, the categorical accuracy is the proportion of
inputs categorized in the desired class.
BEGAN M-global score. The BEGAN-inspired adap-
tive loss presented in Section 3.2.1 comes with another
useful metric from the same study: the global convergence
score Mglobal [15]. This metric is defined as :
Mglobal = LS + |γkLS − LS◦G|,
in which LS is the loss of the surrogate on noise inputs
and LS◦G is the loss of the surrogate on inputs generated
by the GAMIN generator.
The M-global convergence score provides an insight on
the convergence of both networks, which is helpful to as-
sess the overall convergence since the adversarial nature
of the GAMIN architecture means an improvement of the
surrogate may impact the generator (and vice versa). A
strength of this score is that it can be computed in a
black-box setting as it only relies on the discrimination
between different types of inputs used to train the sur-
rogate. This score and the adaptive loss are updated at
the same time.
3.2.4 Attack protocol and budget
To perform an attack, GAMIN is given a query budget,
which represents the number of queries that can be sent
to the target model T . GAMIN is then trained against
the target model, saving both the surrogate and the gen-
erator whenever the M-global score improves (see Section
3.2.3) while tracking the remaining query budget. Upon
exhausting the query budget, the generator with the low-
est M-global score is used as the result of the attack to
generate the targeted inputs.
This approach provides two main benefits. First, it
helps to determine the actual number of queries needed
to achieve the best result. Second, it preserves the best
model observed during training, which means that catas-
trophic forgetting or a decrease in performance will have
a lesser impact on the final performance of the attack.
3.3 Post-processing
Early experiments lead us to observe that when we attack
datasets in which diverse inputs correspond to the same
output (i.e, the same class), the individual outputs of
the generator do not converge to one of these specific
inputs but rather that the mean of those generated inputs
converged to the mean of the original inputs. Despite
this limitation, we are nonetheless able to exploit the
results of the GAMIN training by aggregating its results
as described in the following procedure.
3.3.1 Signal post-processing pipeline
Once the generator has been trained, the following pro-
cess is used to retrieve the best version of the attacked
class’ mean. This process has to be applied separately
for each channel when dealing with color images, each
channel containing one color distribution.
Batch generation of outputs. The first step consists
in using our model to generate a large batch of outputs
from noise. Our experiments have shown that 1000 sam-
ples are sufficient to achieve a satisfactory sample of the
variation between individual pictures.
Low-pass common frequency filter. Then, each pic-
ture is transposed into the frequency domain via a
Fast-Fourier Transform (FTT). The frequencies are then
counted pixel-wise on all FTT images. Afterward, a filter
is applied to remove frequencies that do not appear in at
least 90% of the FTT batch samples. Due to the fre-
quency distribution on our experiment, this is equivalent
to a low-pass filter.
Reconstruction. The samples are mapped back to the
spatial domain before applying a Gaussian blur to each
of them, followed by an edge detection filter. Finally, the
“final” output is obtained from the pixel-wise median of
the transformed batch.
3.3.2 Results
The post-processing routine has considerably enhanced
the visual quality of generated images by removing a good
part of the noise cluttering the individual output (see
Figure 2 for an example).
Figure 2: Raw GAMIN output example (left), result
of the post-processing on the same attack (center), and
mean of the attacked class in original dataset (right).
Further post-processing such as thresholds or poster-
ization could still be added to improve the quality of
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images, but those are not central to our study and are
left to explore as future work.
4 Black-box model inversion at-
tacks
In this section, we present the results obtained against
several target models. First, we present the datasets
used to trained the target models as well as the mod-
els themselves before reporting on the results obtained.
Afterwards, we discuss on how to evaluate the success
of a GAMIN attack as well as the associated cost be-
fore finally reporting how models trained with differen-
tial privacy as a possible countermeasure are affected by
the attack. The source code of GAMIN is available on
github1.
4.1 Targets and evaluation setting
4.1.1 MNIST dataset
The MNIST Dataset of 70,000 handwritten digits (see
examples in Figure 3) was used to train target mod-
els for a image recognition task. More precisely, in this
case the recognition task consists in associating an image
passed as input to a class corresponding to the digit the
image represent. In this dataset, the images are of low-
sizes (square of size 28 by 28 pixels) and black-and-white,
which provides a relatively low-cost task.
Figure 3: Examples of MNIST digits.
The target models were trained on a defined propor-
tion of the dataset accounting for 60,000 images, the rest
being used for testing.
4.1.2 Pilot parliament dataset
Compiled by Joy Buolamwini [19] from official por-
traits of parliament representatives across the globe, this
dataset of 1270 color images of different sizes is classified
according to sex and skin color (across the 6 Fitzpatrick
skin categories), which are inherently sensitive attributes.
1https://github.com/definitively-not-a-lab-rat/gamin
Figure 4: Pilot parliament dataset samples.
In contrast to MNIST, this dataset is composed of colored
pictures. Note that for our experiment we have reshape
all images to the same size, which implies that some faces
are distorted compared to the original versions. The tar-
get models were trained on 1079 portraits, the remainder
being kept for the testing phase.
4.1.3 Target models and training setup
Types of models. Targets of various architectures were
trained in order to see if a model’s complexity impact the
performance of the GAMIN attack. Overall, five models
were considered as targets, which are named by order of
increasing complexity: one softmax regression (Soft), two
multilayer perceptron networks (MLP1 and MLP2 ), and
two convolutional neural networks (CNN1 and CNN2 ).
The architectures of these models are detailed in Ap-
pendix A.1.2. These architectures were chosen because
of their prevalence in privacy and security-oriented lit-
erature. More precisely, Soft and MLP1 models were
attacked in [6] and [10], while MLP2, CNN1 and CNN2
were part of the targets in [14].
Performance with respect to overfitting. The objec-
tive of our study is to attack realistic models with im-
perfect performance and not ones that have overfitted.
Indeed, as overfitted models present very sharp decision
boundaries, this usually renders the model inversion at-
tack quite easy but also unrelated to real-world problems.
While training with the pilot parliament dataset, only
CNN1 and CNN2 models delivered good results. How-
ever, the Soft model was also included in the study for
comparison despite its lesser performance. The full de-
tails of each target model performance are summarized
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in Appendix B.
Training setup. The surrogate has been trained with
an Adam optimizer [18] regarding to this adaptive loss
with the following parameters for the optimizer: learn-
ing rate of 10−5, β1 = 0.99, β2 = 0.99,  = 10−8 and for
the adaptive loss: λk = 0.01, γk = 0.5 and k0 = 0.001.
The generator has also been trained with an Adam op-
timizer configured similarly to the surrogate’s with the
following parameters for the optimizer: learning rate of
10−5, β1 = 0.99, β2 = 0.99 and  = 10−8. These pa-
rameters are fairly standard and yield good results for
the problems the GAMIN was confronted to. Remark
that an extensive hyperparameter search is a non-trivial
process in the black-box setting.
4.2 Attack against MNIST-trained tar-
gets
4.2.1 Evaluation survey
To measure how well GAMIN solves the model inversion
problem from a privacy point of view, we cannot rely
on pixel-wise errors or distances between distributions.
Indeed, since the objective is to extract sensitive infor-
mation from a model, we have to rely on human interpre-
tation of the results to evaluate whether they successfully
disclose information about the training data or not. In
order to measure this information leakage on MNIST, we
set up a survey in which we showed to 13 participants the
results of the model inversion of the GAMIN and asked
them to guess which specific digit they thought was rep-
resented.
4.2.2 Results
The results of the survey are summarized in Figure 5.
In this figure, average displays the percentage of correct
inference of digits averaged across all 10 digits while ma-
jority depicts the percentage of classes (i.e., digits) for
which more than half the volunteers guessed the correct
digit from the pictures they were shown. In our experi-
ments, a correct guess is awarded only when the partici-
pant picked the right digit. In opposition, giving a wrong
answer or selecting the option “unable to decide” answers
were counted as negative results.
In the best case, when attacking the soft model, volun-
teers were able to pick the attacked digit in 55% of cases,
assessing the reconstruction of 6 out of 10 digits. How-
ever, the ability of the GAMIN to invert models seems
to be dramatically affected by the complexity of the tar-
get model, with both average number of correct answers
and number of classes successfully inverted dropping to
respectively 20% and 1 out of 10 for the CNN2 architec-
ture.
Convolutional models, which were not targeted by
model inversion attacks in previous works, proved to be
more resistant to these attacks. In particular, the drop
in reconstruction accuracy that occurs when attacking
deeper models could be explained directly by their com-
plexity, as the link between decision boundaries and clas-
sification becomes less and less direct.
By taking a look at the GAMIN output for the same
digit, we can observe the captured decision boundaries
(see Figure 6), which confirm that the reconstruction
given when attacking the soft architecture has usually
sharp and identifiable features that are directly linked to
the value of a region, whereas models using convolutions
(i.e., CNN1 and CNN2) use patterns and filters before
selecting the class resulting in blurred and more abstract
images.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Average Majority
Target model
CNN1
CNN2
MLP1
MLP2
Soft
Figure 5: Results of the survey for MNIST-based models
attack. For each target model, the average (over all the
target digits) of the proportion of correct identification
is given as well as the proportion of target digits with at
least 50% of correct identification.
Soft MLP1 MLP2 CNN1 CNN2
Figure 6: Reconstruction of the same digit (i.e., eight) is-
sued from attacking different models. Raw outputs sam-
ples are located on the top while postprocessed outputs
can be found on the bottom).
A closer look at the results breakdown between digits
(displayed on Figure 7) shows a strong disparity among
digits. Interestingly, some digits (2 and 3) are consis-
tently inverted with success, whereas others such as for
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instance 1, display the opposite behaviour as the GAMIN
attack fails to reconstruct these most of the time. A plau-
sible explanation of the difference in accuracy when at-
tacking those different classes could be the amount of
recognizable features each of these class have. While
this might considered a subjective notion, recall that the
mean of the GAMIN outputs tends to converge to the
mean of the targeted class.
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Figure 7: Results of the survey for MNIST-based models
attack. For each target model and for each target digit,
the proportion of correct identification is given.
4.3 Metrics and relation to success of the
attack
The average metrics defined previously in Section 3.2 for
each target model trained on MNIST are displayed in
Table 1. For each GAMIN attack, the average over all
10 digits is denoted as FS for the fidelity of the surrogate
model, AS◦G for the categorical accuracy of the com-
bined model and Mglobal for the best global score of con-
vergence. The ratio of correct re-identification by the
respondants of the survey is also provided for compari-
son.
Figure 8: Averages for digits 1 and 3 on the MNIST
dataset.
First, we can observe that there is an absence of cor-
relations between the accuracy AS◦G of the combined
model and the success rate of the re-identification by hu-
man volunteers. For instance, by comparing the mean of
a digit with frequent success (the 3) to a digit with rare
success (such as the 1) displayed on Figure 8, we observe
that the classification task of a representation of an im-
age’s mean might not be sufficient to evaluate completely
the success of the model inversion attack. Nonetheless,
the relatively high fidelity scores yielded by most attacks
demonstrate that the surrogate is able to capture, at least
partially, the decision boundaries of the target model.
Target model FS AS◦G Mglobal %correct
Soft 0.91 0.98 0.06 0.553
MLP1 0.73 1.0 0.08 0.492
MLP2 0.71 1.0 0.18 0.284
CNN1 0.83 0.74 0.19 0.269
CNN2 0.56 1.0 0.16 0.207
Table 1: Average performances across all digits of in-
version attacks against the target models. FS , AS◦G,
Mglobal and %correct refer respectively to the fidelity of
the surrogate, the categorical accuracy of the combined
model, the global convergence score and the accuracy as
evaluated through the survey.
To further investigate the link between FS andMglobal
as well as the attack success, we provide an extensive
review of the final score when attacking each digit against
the MLP1 architecture in Table 2. These results show
that a surrogate model achieving a very high fidelity or
very low global convergence score might not be sufficient
to achieve a good model inversion. In particular, this
table provides examples with digits 1 and 9 of attacks
that failed to reconstruct recognizable digits, yet achieve
Mglobal scores among the lowest. Furthermore, attacks
against digit 1 also achieved fidelity scores comparable
to that of any successful attack.
Target digit FS Mglobal %correct
0 0.83 0.06 0.31
1 0.75 0.07 0.15
2 0.78 0.07 0.92
3 0.74 0.09 1.00
4 0.73 0.10 0.23
5 0.75 0.11 0.69
6 0.77 0.07 0.23
7 0.86 0.09 0.62
8 0.77 0.08 0.69
9 0.36 0.08 0.08
Table 2: Per-digit performances of inversion attacks
against the MLP1 model. FS , Mglobal, and %correct are
respectively the fidelity of the surrogate, the global con-
vergence score, and the accuracy as evaluated with the
survey
The results demonstrate that the GAMIN surrogate
needs to achieve a high fidelity FS to succeed, which is
consistent with using fidelity as a measure of how well
the decision boundaries are captured. However, this is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure the
success of the attack.
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4.4 Attacks against skin color classifiers
Subtle, yet recognizable facial shapes can be observed on
the images generated after attacking a skin color classi-
fier trained on the pilot parliament dataset (see Figures
9 and 10). Interestingly enough, even the central area
of the image does not give a hint of the skin color of in-
dividuals. Instead, the decision boundaries captured by
the surrogate model are based on contours.
While the outputs of the GAMIN attack against the
CNN1 architecture remain blurry and noisy enough to
disclose few features of the members of each class, the
attack against the soft architecture gives away more pre-
cise contours. However, the attack against the Softmax
skin classifier yields results which, unlike the ones ob-
tained on MNIST classifier in Section 4.2.2, did not seem
to converge to the attacked class mean (compare for in-
stance Figure 10 to Figure 11).
In this case, it could be argue that even if the faces are
undetermined, the clothes alone might be enough to con-
stitute a privacy breach. The privacy leak depicted here
is more similar to a property inference attack [34, 35],
which aim at inferring global properties of the training set
of the target model. In contrast to previous implementa-
tions of such attacks [34, 35] that work in the white-box
setting, GAMIN aims to infer properties of the target
model’s training set in the black-box agnostic setting.
Figure 9: Outputs of attack against a CNN1 skin color
classifier.
While Fredrikson and co-authors have already ob-
tained recognizable faces against a model of similar archi-
tecture in the white-box setting [6] and Tramèr and col-
leagues proposed a more efficient black-box attack based
on successive extraction and inversion of the model [10],
the GAMIN provides another black-box alternative that
does not require the adversary to have information about
the target’s architecture.
4.5 Cost of the attack
The budget allowed for attacking each model was
1, 280, 000 queries (or equivalently 20, 000 batches of 64
Figure 10: Outputs of attack against a soft skin color
classifier.
Figure 11: Mean of original attacked class.
queries). However, the protocol described previously in
Section 3.2.4 enabled to easily retrieve the required num-
ber of batches to achieve convergence in terms of the
M-global score. Depending on the attacked digits, the
GAMIN achieves convergence towards “final” results af-
ter 2, 000 to 20, 000 batches of training, with an average
of 2, 500 batches. In particular, each epoch requires 128
queries to the target model, giving an average of 320, 000
queries per attack.
Compared to other black-box attacks targeting even
larger datasets (∼ 41, 000 online queries in [10], and
20, 600 in [6] for attacking a model trained on the AT&T
Faces dataset of larger dimension [20]), the GAMIN is
significantly more expensive in terms of queries. How-
ever, this increased cost could be attributed to the higher
complexity of target models and is also balanced by the
flexibility of GAMIN.
Despite the higher complexity in terms of queries, if we
estimate that it takes 70 ms in terms of latency for query-
ing the target, as in [6, 14] and not accounting for the
speed increase offered by batch queries, a GAMIN attack
could be completed in six hours. In addition assuming the
adversary benefits from GPU acceleration, the networks
training takes negligible time compared to querying the
oracle.
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4.6 Attacks against models trained with
differential privacy
To evaluate how well our attack fare against protection
mechanisms, we evaluate the effect of differential privacy
on the success on an inversion attack against a MLP
model. For this experiment, we focus on the MLP1
architecture described in Section 4.1.3. To train mod-
els with this architecture with differential privacy, we
use the noisy batched stochastic gradient descent algo-
rithm [40], with the implementation provided in tensor-
flow/privacy 2. In particular, we set the privacy parame-
ter δ to 1e−5 and train a model achieving a test accuracy
of 0.89 for a privacy parameter  = 2.9.
Target model FS AS◦G Mglobal
MLP1 without DP 0.73 1.0 0.08
MLP1 with DP 0.74 0.96 0.16
Table 3: Average performances across all digits after
model inversion attacks against MLP models trained
with (and without) differential privacy. FS , AS◦G and
Mglobal are respectively the fidelity of the surrogate, the
categorical accuracy of the combined model, and the
global convergence score.
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Figure 12: Results of the survey for attacks against
MLP1 model with (respectively without) differential pri-
vacy. For each target model and for each target digit, the
proportion of correct identification is given.
Table 3 and Figure 12 summarize the results obtained.
These results seem to indicate that the use of differential
privacy does not prevent the convergence of the training
of GAMIN and the success of the attack. This observa-
tion is consistent with findings from previous works that
have analyzed the impact of differential privacy on inver-
sion attacks [26, 41, 48]. Intuitively this can be explained
by the fact that differentially private learning techniques
are essentially designed to protect against membership
attack. In contrast protecting against model inversion
attacks is similar in spirit as protecting the membership
2https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
of all items that belong to a particular class, which re-
quire to apply some notion of group privacy. However,
by doing so, the utility of the model will be negatively
impacted.
5 Related work
Prior works related to privacy attacks against discrimi-
native models in the supervised learning setting include
adversarial attacks, membership inference attacks [5, 37],
property inference attacks [34, 35], model inversion at-
tacks [6, 26] and model extraction attacks [10, 39, 38]. In
addition to regularization techniques, differential privacy
is the workhorse used to address most of the inference
attacks against machine learning models.
5.1 Adversarial attacks
The main idea of the adversarial setting is that an attack
consists in crafting an input, which is then sent to the
target model. The objective is to affect the target model
in a controlled and desired manner. For example, eva-
sion attacks aims to avoid a certain classification, in the
sense that the objective is to produce anything but the
specified class for a certain input [31, 32]. Such attacks
were successfully performed against shallow models such
as SVMs or RBF Kernels, using a gradient-descent-based
algorithm, by crafting adversarial examples that crossed
decision boundaries by a large margin (which translates
as a high confidence in the faked class) [31]. A more
modern approach based on GANs has also proved to be
able to fool deep neural models [14], even on temporal or
recurrent architectures [33].
Both of the approaches described above rely on learn-
ing how to respectively maximize a utility or minimize a
loss function reflecting the confusion of the target model.
The learning process uses the gradient of this function to
change parameters but such gradients are not accessible
in a white-box setting. However, this can be countered
by the concept of shadow training [5], which consists in
training surrogate models, learning to attack these sur-
rogate - or “shadow” - models and then transferring the
attack to the target model [29, 30]. The use of a surro-
gate model in the GAMIN is inspired from the shadow
training method.
5.2 Inference attacks against machine
learning models
Membership attacks against machine learning models
have been introduced by Shokri, Stronati, Song and
Shmatikov [5]. Given a data record d and a trained
model M trained over a training dataset DMtrain, a mem-
bership inference attack consist in trying to evaluate if
d ∈ DMtrain. For instance, the authors demonstrated
in 2017 the possibility for an adversary to assess the
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presence of a given individual in hospital datasets in a
true black-box setting, highlighting the potential privacy
damage this type of attack can cause. This type of at-
tack exploits the fact that machine learning models may
be subject to overfitting (i.e, being significantly more ac-
curate at predicting outputs for the training data than
predicting outputs for the test data). The attack involves
training multiple shadow models, each using the same
machine learning technique as that of the target model,
and using a dataset similar to that of the target model.
However, this is done by explicitly labeling predictions
vectors on its training set and its test set differently. Fi-
nally, a classifier is trained to distinguish training data
from test data. Membership attacks have also been stud-
ied by Melis, Song, de Cristofaro and Shmatikov [37] in
the context of collaborative learning, in which the au-
thors showed that the interactive nature of the collab-
oration can be exploited by a participant to conduct a
membership attack on other participants’ training sets.
In addition, Hayes, Melis, Danezis and de Cristofaro have
demonstrated in the context of generative models [36]
that generative adversarial networks [11] can be used to
infer the presence of a particular individual in the train-
ing set.
Property inference attacks against machine learn-
ing models have been introduced by Ateniese and co-
authors [34]. This type of attack involves training a meta-
classifier to detect if the target model has a given prop-
erty P . To conduct such an attack, the adversary trains a
set of shadow models using a dataset and machine learn-
ing technique similar to that of the target model, but in
addition, explicitly labeled as having the property P or
not. Finally, the meta-classifier is trained to detect the
presence of the property P . The authors have used this
attack to learn that the training set of a speech recog-
nition system have been produced by people speaking
a particular dialect. Remark that the shadow training
technique developed here is the same that has inspired
the membership attacks [5]. More recently, property in-
ference attacks have been studied [37] in the context
of collaborative learning, in which the authors demon-
strated that the collaborative gradient update that oc-
curs in this type of learning can be exploited by the ad-
versary to infer properties that are true for a subset of the
training set of other participants. Ganju, Wang, Yang,
Gunther and Borisov [35] have further demonstrated the
effectiveness of property inference attacks on more com-
plex machine learning models such as fully connected
neural networks.
Model inversion attacks aim at inferring, given a tar-
get model f and an output class y, sensitive hidden fea-
tures of inputs corresponding to the class y. As a result,
the adversary will learn the average of the features of
inputs that belong to the class y. Model inversion at-
tacks have been used originally [6] to infer if participants
to a survey admitted of having cheated on their signifi-
cant other by inverting decision trees, and to reconstruct
people’s faces by inverting a facial recognition system
trained using three different classifiers, namely a softmax
classifier, a multilayer perceptron network and a denois-
ing autoencoder. Recently, Hitaj, Ateniese and Perez-
Cruz [26] have demonstrated that model inversion can be
more powerful in collaborative machine learning context
in which the adversary can train a generative adversarial
network during the update phase to create prototypical
examples of its target’s training set. Hidano, Murakami,
Katsumata, Kiyomoto and Hanaoka [46] have introduced
a model inversion attack that does not leverage on the
knowledge of non-sensitive attributes of the input, un-
der the assumption that the target model is operating in
the online setting. In particular, a poisoning attack [44]
is conducted on the target model to turn the regression
coefficients of the non-sensitive attributes to zero. The
resulting target model then becomes easy to invert, using
the same approach proposed in [45, 6], without requiring
additional knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes.
Finally, model extraction attacks aim at inferring,
given a target model f and its predictions (or explana-
tions) for a chosen set of inputs, the parameters and/or
hyper-parameters of f . Tramer and co-authors [10] have
demonstrated the effectiveness of such attacks by recon-
structing several machine learning models after querying
online machine learning as a service platforms. Wang
and Cong [39] have also proposed attacks to steal hyper-
parameters of several machine learning models. More re-
cently, Milli, Schmidt, Dragan and Hardt [38] have shown
how attacks exploiting gradient-based explanations can
allow to extract models with significant less query bud-
get compared to attacks based on predictions. Batina,
Bashin, Jap and Picek [42] have proposed an attack
against neural networks that leverages on a side-channel
attack. In particular, it monitors the power use of the mi-
croprocessor on which the target model is evaluated to
extract its weights. Jagielski, Carlini, Berthelot, Kurakin
and Papernot [47] have leveraged on MixMatch [43], a
semi-supervised learning technique, to produce a query-
efficient learning-based extraction attack, which trains a
surrogate on inputs labelled by the target model. The au-
thors also introduced a functionally-equivalent extraction
attack, which produces a surrogate that belongs to the
equivalence class of the target model, that demonstrated
better fidelity. Finally, they proposed a hybrid approach
that combines functionally-equivalent extraction attacks
and learning-based extraction attacks to improve the fi-
delity of the surrogate model.
Remark that model extraction is not per se a privacy
attack. However, it can be used to build white-box sur-
rogates of the target model and thus ultimately help in
improving the efficiency of other inference attacks. The
main difference between GAMIN and the existing attacks
is that it operates in a black-box agnostic setting, which
allows the attack to be easily deployed against any ma-
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chine learning model. In addition, the computational
cost of the attack (about 6 hours on a MLP) is accept-
able. To compare, the estimated cost of a black-box at-
tack — based on numeric gradient approximation [6] —
against a MLP is about 50 to 80 days.
5.3 Countermeasures against inference
attacks
Adding noise to individual records while maintaining
global distribution and correlations is at the core of the
concept of differential privacy, a privacy model devel-
oped by Dwork and co-authors [23] to balance the risk
of privacy loss and the degradation of accuracy results of
analysis run on a dataset of private records. Recently,
the application of differential private methods to ma-
chine learning has drawn a lot of attention from privacy
researchers and stemmed multiple approaches. One of
these approaches relied on the training of deep networks
over data distributed among multiple users [24]. After-
wards, new attacks were designed to address this specific
setting [26, 27]. Differential privacy was also integrated
in the design of a stochastic gradient descent algorithm
[25]. However, the inherent trade-off between the pri-
vacy level and the performance of models trained with
this method has already been pointed out in previous
works [28, 48].
To measure the resistance of a model against member-
ship inference attacks, Long, Bindschaedler and Gunter
introduced the concept of differential training privacy [4]
and showed that countermeasures such as distillation
may not be sufficient to counter this type of attack. In
their study of model inversion attacks [6], Fredrikson,
Jha and Ristenpart suggest to round confidence scores
to reduce the vulnerability of models to equation-solving
attacks in the black-box setting. However, this can de-
crease the precision on the gradient retrieved from tar-
get model as intended. Against a black-box GAMIN at-
tack, this would reduce the capacity of the surrogate to
correctly approximate the target’s decision boundaries.
While this may result in a lesser quality of the reconstruc-
tions or even a failure of GAMIN attacks, the efficiency
of this defense could be also differ greatly as boundaries
retrieved by the surrogate could appear less strict, which
could ultimately facilitate the training of the generator.
6 Conclusion and future works
In this paper, we have demonstrated how adversarial
approaches can be adapted to achieve model inversion
attacks against machine learning models in an agnostic
black-box setting. We have shown the potential threat
of privacy leakage posed by these attacks by testing our
architecture against models trained on a dataset of hand-
written digits and another of face portraits for which we
were able to reconstruct recognizable digits or features.
In addition our attack works in multiple scenarios, includ-
ing the situation in which the adversary has absolutely no
prior knowledge of the target models and without specific
parameter optimization.
We have also reviewed a variety of measures that could
be proposed to measure the success of model inversion at-
tacks and shows that usual and intuitive metrics may not
be sufficient to predict the attack success. Furthermore,
we show that models of increasing complexity, like con-
volutional neural networks, are more resistant to model
inversion thanks to the abstraction and dilution of their
decision boundaries.
We are planning to extend our approach in several di-
rections. In particular, future work will include the test-
ing of GAMIN against different types of targets, such
as regressors or recurrent architectures and the study of
countermeasures against this type of attack. We believe
that the GAMIN can still be improved to further improve
accuracy or to decrease the cost of this attack in terms
of queries. The GAMIN could benefit from being tested
against targets trained on different types of data, either
as inputs (i.e., sequential data for instance) or as outputs
(i.e., regressors). Further development of this architec-
ture could allow for instance a single GAMIN to invert
multiple outputs. In this case, the cost of the attack
would not decrease directly, but a single attack could in-
vert multiple classes, which would dramatically reduce
the cost of inverting all classes of the model.
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A Gallery of models
This appendix lists the models used in this study, both as
parts of the GAMIN architecture and as targets models.
A.1 Image classification
A.1.1 GAMIN surrogate model
IN OUT CM CM RL D RL D S
784 10 32 64 128 0.5 32 0.5 10
Table 4: GAMIN surrogate for MNIST image classifica-
tion model attacks. IN denotes the dimension of inputs,
OUT the dimension of outputs, CM is a 2D convolution
of kernel size (3x3) with ReLU activation followed by a
max pooling over (2x2), RL is a Rectified Linear Unit
fully-connected layer, D is the proportion of dropout be-
tween these layers and S a softmax (output) layer.
Table 4 describes the model used to perform the
GAMIN attack against models trained over the MNIST
dataset. Note that since the convolutions used in this
model have a different filter size than those used for the
targets (see Section A.1.2), the surrogate has very little
in common with the target beyond the dimensions of its
inputs and outputs.
A.1.2 Target models
Name IN OUT CM CM RL RL S
Soft 784 10 10
MLP1 784 10 100 10
MLP2 784 10 200 200 10
CNN1 784 10 32 200 10
CNN2 784 10 32 64 200 10
Table 5: Target models for MNIST image classification.
IN denotes the dimension of inputs, OUT the dimension
of outputs, CM is a 2D convolution of kernel size (2x2)
with ReLU activation followed by a max pooling over
(2x2), RL us a Rectified Linear Unit fully-connected layer
and S is a softmax (output) layer.
Table 5 describes all models used to classify MNIST
digits.
A.2 Image generation
A.2.1 GAMIN generator mode
Table 6 displays the details of the GAMIN Generator
architecture for reconstructing handwritten digits.
IN OUT L CM D CM D CM TAN
10 784 784 128 0.5 128 0.5 64 784
Table 6: GAMIN Generator for MNIST image classifica-
tion model attacks. IN denotes the dimension of inputs,
OUT the dimension of outputs, CM is a 2D convolution
of kernel size (3x3) with ReLU activation followed by a
max pooling over (2x2), D is the proportion of dropout
between these layers and TAN is a fully-connected layer
with tanh activation (output layer).
B Target performance breakdown
All the accuracies of target models are listed in Tables 7
and 8 for models trained respectively, on the MNIST and
on the pilot parliament datasets. We denote by Atrain
& Atest the accuracy respectively over the training and
testing datasets.
MNIST target digit Atrain Atest
Soft 0.85 0.83
MLP1 0.93 0.91
MLP2 0.97 0.94
CNN1 0.99 0.99
CNN2 0.98 0.99
Random baseline 0.1 0.1
Table 7: Target accuracy on MNIST Dataset
Pilot Parliament: skin color Atrain Atest
Soft 0.43 0.33
CNN1 1.0 0.99
CNN2 1.0 1.0
Random baseline 0.17 0.17
Table 8: Target accuracy on pilot parliament dataset.
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